Is there a role for popular grand history—the grand old
history of names, narratives, and (scariest and dodgiest of all) nations—in the
age of Wikipedia?
At the
dawn of the present century, writers, publishers, and readers of the genre must
have counted not merely on its survival, but revival. September 11, for all its
self-consciously seismic effects on the surrounding discourse, only affirmed
the apparent trend. What, after all, is the end of History—in the teleological,
species-encompassing monotony of either classic liberalism or revolutionary
Marxism—but a return to the colorful history of maps and chaps,
sects and infidels, great walls and defenestrations, the past as telenovela? Indeed, following five
decades or more of the most totalizing, ineludibly modern sort of ideo-economic
(not to mention industrio-ballistic) conflict, we've reached a historical
moment transfixed, and perplexed, by goings-on in Mesopotamia, revolts against
Pharaoh, and cultural–fiscal tiffs between Latin and Germanic Europe.
So Penguin was, in a way,
exquisitely prescient when it set off, in the parlance of comic-book mythos
without beginning or end, to "reboot" its Penguin History of Europe a decade ago. After William Chester
Jordan's Europe in the High Middle Ages (2004), Chris Wickham's The Inheritance of Rome:
Illuminating the Dark Ages, 400–1000 (2007),
and Tim Blanning's The Pursuit of Glory: Europe
1648–1815 (2009)—Penguin's
chronology is as confoundingly ad hoc as a Hulk
or Superman film franchise—the
series now alights on the origin story, or "A History from Troy to Augustine."
Series editor David Cannadine is a scholar of the British Empire by trade (he
wrote 2001's clever and influential Ornamentalism), but his instincts as historiographical casting
director appear as well acquitted to the haze of Pax Romana and its B.C.
antecedents as they were to the more recent Peaces, of Westphalia and Vienna,
which bookended Blanning's well-received entry. Perhaps the greatest tribute
one can give Oxford classicists Simon Price and Peter Thonemann is that The Birth of Classical Europe reads nothing at all like a textbook, despite being
charged to cover about twice the ground in 350 pages—1750 B.C. to A.D. 475,
give or take—than its three much longer predecessors combined.
Of course there was, for
better or worse, probably more of the raw "stuff" of history—written
(and electronic) correspondence, commercial records, diplomatic "cables"—created
in the first month of 2011 than in the entire second millennium B.C. Still,
Price and Thonemann have an uncanny feel for evidence capable of appealing
viscerally to modern, relatively well-informed civilians as neither arcane (the
pointy-head specialist trapping us in the trees) nor cheap (the silver-tongued "intellectual"
cultivating his public). Though the derivative high literature is properly (and
succinctly) surveyed, the outsize affective role of Troy—a war, after all,
which no serious archaeologist will quite exactly
confirm took place—is most neatly demonstrated by a bit of Banksy-clever
found art: already in 730 B.C., far afield in the Bay of Naples, a
twelve-year-old boy is buried with a wine cup inscribed, in Euboean, with a
joke obliquely referencing Nestor, mythic king of Pylos. Similarly, the rather
absurdist hangover of classical prestige that's plagued Europe since the
nineteenth century is evoked through episodes perfectly pitched between
farcical and tragic. Consider, for instance, modern Greece's decade-long
geo-linguistic campaign against international recognition of the Republic of
Macedonia, because the Macedon of Alexander the Great was Hellene while today's
imposters are Slavs. This is the richest irony; as Price and Thonemann recount
elsewhere, Alexander's sixth-century forbearer needed a legal dispensation to
compete in the Pan-Hellenic Olympics since no one was convinced the tribal and
king-ruled Macedonians were Greek, at
least in the way of the city-states.
In
fact, it may be in the focus on the vagaries and self-flatteries of identity
that The Birth of Classical Europe
comes closest to the tone and texture of old-school popular history. One
imagines the young man, otherwise schooled in engineering or poetry, reading
Edward Gibbon before embarking on a career in colonial administration—or Will
Durant before joining the State Department. (His female companions were surely
honing skills more crucial and less remunerative—French, say, or typing.) There
is, in other words, a certain expansionist philosophy inherent in any attempt
to capture 2000 years in 400 pages: that the world is both contingent and, for
the properly acculturated, coherent. Like the best of their predecessors, Price
and Thonemann aren't propagandists or court chroniclers, but actually
gracefully incorporate recent academic threads and theories—even Martin Bernal's
oft-caricatured "Black Athena" hypothesis is given a fair hearing.
Their genre, however, remains decidedly touristic and so, arguably, static: like
the Durants' 11-volume The Story of
Civilization, say, or Churchill's History of the English-Speaking Peoples (which Labour rival Clement Attlee piquantly renamed
"Things in History that Interest Me"), the imagined audience is not
the budding scholar primed ultimately to make her own advances in the field,
but the cosmopolitan and curious, moving up from the Encyclopedia Britannica.
Which, of course, is where
our own history seems to contravene on Penguin's good intentions. Launched in January 2001, Wikipedia
finally emblematizes nothing less than a revolution for the armchair historian,
the cultural dilettante (or polymath) of all kinds. In 1796 or 1996—the year Penguin published its previous History of Europe, a one-volume opus by J. M. Roberts—the layman prodded for whatever
reason to vague interest in the Minoans (the mysterious
pre-Greek inhabitants of Crete) could have moved from the Britannica (or Encarta) entry to a treatment like Price and Thonemann's 22 pages on the topic and come away
sated. Today, via hyperlink and ubiquitous bandwidth, he could spend as many
hours as his determination or day-job allows reviewing hyper-detailed
blueprints of every Minoan palace, considering the purported matriarchal or
even proto-feminist subtext of Minoan bull-jumping, "reading" every
extant inscription of Linear A, the undeciphered Minoan script. This is
certainly no replacement for actual scholarship—actual archaeology and philology
and dendrology—but it also represents more than a difference in scale, along
some trajectory a real classicist might say started with the Library of
Alexandria. Indeed, the library model—the encyclopedia model—has, almost
imperceptibly, inverted itself even as we continue using its metaphors: for the
first time in the popular dispersal of knowledge, it is easier for the casual
explorer to reach the raw details, the material evidence, the internecine
theoretical squabbles and, yes, even the elaborately manicured fabrications,
than any finite, authorized, and authoritative account.
In such a world, the
obvious defense of a volume like The
Birth of Classical Europe is the one that Britannica, for one, spent years plaintively raising against
Wikipedia: namely, that average folk need, above all, not information but proportion—to know, as was famously
argued, that Tony Blair deserves more words than Harry Potter, even if both
accounts are exponentially more detailed and current than anything easily
available in print. Such an impulse far precedes the Internet. In earlier
centuries, popular grand history could rather openly be predicated on imparting
a certain chronological and moral elegance to its subject matter—all of Western
civilization leading, for the Whig historians, to the British parliamentary
settlement; for the Marxists, to bourgeois hegemony, then world revolution. The
reason Price and Thonemann aren't saved by appeals to proportion or curation
is, ironically but unsurprisingly, the same thing that makes their take on an
old form so laudably modern: they're too sophisticated—or too respectful of
their audience's sophistication—to attempt the feel-good sophistry long
synonymous with "popular."
But The Birth of Classical Europe isn't a
formless cloud of facts and dates, without narrative or argument. (Neither is
Wikipedia, incidentally.) At its core is indeed a "meta-narrative" as
definitive and, in its way, as political as any of the discredited dogmas.
Again and again, this Penguin history foregrounds the way their pasts, real and imagined, loomed in the individual psyches
and collective consciousness of people who never knew themselves as "ancients."
Charmingly, Price and Thonemann make a running gag of provincial cities
lobbying the metropole—Athens, or Macedon, or Rome—for privileges based on, as
the centuries wore on, ever more convoluted ethno-fraternal ties dating to the
Trojan War. One might be tempted to conclude that Troy, across the Aegean on
Asia Minor, became in the collective imaginary the ur-instance of that great
European preoccupation: Occident vs. Orient, the West against the rest. Many
third-century Romans, locked in wars with Persia as interminable as America's
against "terror," loudly said just that. But they'd have quickly run
up against the complications of history as argument—Rome's millennium-old
founding myth had the city settled by the Trojan,
not the Achaean (Greek), survivors of the war.
They were, in other words,
as confused about themselves as we are about them—perhaps the grandest
historical lesson of all.
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